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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES NICHOLAS STRAIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860531 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Should the trial court have excluded defendant's 
confession based upon an alleged Miranda violation? 
2. Should the trial court have excluded defendant's 
confession on the alternative ground that it was involuntary? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Charles Nicholas Strain, was charged with 
second degree murder, a first degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 76-5-203 (1978) (amended 1986) (R. 16). After a jury found 
defendant guilty as charged, the trial court sentenced him to the 
Utah State Prison for a term of five years to life (R. 131, 151). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
The following facts are pertinent to the issues raised 
on appeal. Pursuant to an investigation of the shooting of his 
stepdaughter in Utah, defendant was arrested and questioned by 
* These facts are derived from the August 21, 1986 rehearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress his confession (R. 165-213) and 
the trial of defendant's case on September 22 and 23, 1986 (R. 
214-522). The interviews of defendant by the police after his 
arrest were recorded and transcribed. See St.'s Exs. 1-5. 
police officers in Phoenix, Arizona in February 1986. Detective 
Thomas Hill of the Scottsdale Police Department testified that 
when defendant was arrested on February 26, he gave defendant the 
following warning per Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966): 
[Y]ou have the right to remain silent!;] 
anything you say can and will be used against 
you in a court of law. You have the right to 
the presence of an attorney to assist you 
prior to questioning! ,] to be with you during 
questioning if you so desire. If you cannot 
afford an attorney, you have the right to 
have an attorney appointed for you by the 
court at a later date. Do you understand 
these rights? 
(R. 182-83). Defendant responded that he understood his rights 
(R. 436).2 
In an interview conducted by Detective Peter Bell of 
the Utah County Sheriff's Otfice at the Scottsdale Police 
Department the day of defendant's arrest, defendant denied any 
involvement in the killing of his stepdaughter, indicating that 
he thought a certain member of a drug ring was responsible (St.'s 
Ex. 1). After stating to defendant that he thought defendant had 
killed his stepdaughter, Bell "explained that there were 
different degrees of homicide and that if he wanted the facts as 
[Bell] had them proved!,] he was going to be charged with first 
degree homicide which carried the possible penalty of death or 
life imprisonment." Bell also advised defendant that "if there 
1
 Contrary to the impression created by defendant's brief, Brief 
of Appellant at 7, this fact is supported by the record. 
Although Hill's testimony at the suppression hearing did not make 
clear wnat defendant's response was (R. 183), Hill's trial 
testimony made clear that defendant acknowledged that he 
understood his rights (R. 436). 
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were a reason for killing this stepdaughter] and he could explain 
the reason, second degree homicide charges could be considered 
which would mean some jail time." However, defendant denied 
commission of the crime (St.'s Ex. 1 at 7). 
The following morning, Bell again interviewed 
defendant, who continued to maintain his innocence. During that 
interview, Bell made the following statements to defendant: 
Now, what I'm trying to tell you right now 
Charlie is, all you have to do, all you've 
got to do . . . the only thing that is 
keeping you from going back to the State of 
Utah and looking at a possible execution on a 
first degree murder charge or a second degree 
murder cftarge, which is some jail time. The 
only thing that keeps between them two, is 
"yes, I did or no I didn't." Yes, second 
degree murder, no, I didn't, I will prove 
that you did and you are looking at a 
possible execution date in the State ot Utah. 
That's all I want to hear from you Cftarlie, 
all I want to hear is yes or no. All I want 
to hear, is there going to be first degree 
murder or second degree murder. I don't want 
to hear "no I didn't have nothing to do with 
it," because I can prove it and I'm going to 
prove it. I'll go back to the State of Utah 
today[;] the County Attorney is going to 
file. 
Utah is, and Utah is going to bring you back 
down. Charlie, we're going to try you for 
murder. So, just tell me right now, let's 
just (not understandable), yes for jail time 
or no, are we going to go to trial and for 
possible execution. That's all I want to 
hear from you is just yes or no. 
Charlie, you were with DeeDee [defendant's 
stepdaughter] and you were the only person 
that could have got her to that particular 
spot in that canyon. And the jury is going 
to know that. And when I lay it out, you're 
looking at first degree murder. All I know 
-3-
is that when we go to trial and prove it, 
it's going to be first degree murder. If 
there is any way, any possibility that there 
was mitigating circumstances and I'm sure 
there are, Charlie, I'm sure there is some 
reason in the back of your mind why DeeDee 
had to be killed. 
• • • • 
You might have been drinking, you might have 
been raged, I don't know. But there was a 
reason why DeeDee was killed by you and all I 
have to know is that mitigating circumstance 
and then we'll see second degree murder, if 
you say nothing, we're going first. If you 
just tell me something, Charlie, we've got 
second degree murder. 
St.'s Ex. 2 at 9-11. After these statements had been made, 
defendant admitted being at the crime scene, but denied having 
pulled the trigger on the gun that killed his stepdaughter. Id.# 
That evening, Bell and another officer of the Utah 
County Sheriff's Otfice, Detective Scott Carter, again 
interrogated defendant. At the beginning of this session, 
defendant elaborated on his story tnat he was present when others 
killed his stepdaughter. Bell then made the following statements 
to defendant: 
The matter that he [Scott Carter] is talking 
about Charlie, and I told you earlier today, 
there are two different charges that we are 
talking about here—1st degree murder . . . 
[wlhich is punishable by probably execution 
in the State of Utah, or we are talking about 
2nd degree homicide which is jail time. 
• • • • 
No, let me explain it to you right now. The 
way you explained is that some Mexicants] 
came up and you were aware that they were 
going to kill her and you are a party of her 
killing. We are talking 1st degree murder 
here. 
-a-
[Defendant responds, "I know this,"] 
You could probably be executed. 
St.'s Ex. 2 at 18-19. Shortly thereafter, defendant confessed to 
killing his stepdaughter by shooting her in the head. Id.., at 
21-24. He then signed a typed confession prepared by Bell and 
Carter. St.'s Ex. 41. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
"any and all statements made to law enforcement officers 
following his arrest in the State of Arizona . . •" (R. 26). In 
support of that motion, he argued that his statements should be 
suppressed on two grounds: (1) an inadequate Miranda warning; 
and (2) the involuntariness of his statements due to the 
officers' threat of a first degree murder charge and the 
possibility of execution if defendant did not talk, coupled with 
their promise of filing only a second degree murder charge in 
exchange for a confession (R. 31-42). The trial court, which at 
that time did not have before it the testimony of Detective Hill 
concerning the Miranda warning he had given defendant upon 
defendant's arrest (which is summarized above), ruled that 
because the warnings given defendant by Bell and Carter prior to 
their interviews of defendant were insufficient, all defendant's 
statements would be suppressed (R. 66-72). It did not address 
defendant's additional voluntariness challenge to his confession. 
Shortly after the court's suppression order, the State 
produced the testimony of Detective Hill, and based upon that 
testimony obtained a partial reversal of the order so as to allow 
the admission of defendant's confession. The court ruled the 
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Miranda warning from Hill was adequate; however, it again did not 
treat defendant's alternative voluntariness challenge (R. 95-98)* 
At trial, when Detective Bell testified to the 
confession given him by defendant, defendant objected to tnat 
testimony on both of the grounds asserted in his pretrial motion 
to suppress. Without elaboration, the court overruled the 
objection, citing its amended pretrial ruling as controlling (R. 
458-60). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly refused to suppress 
defendant's confession for an allegedly defective Miranda 
warning. Although the interrogation techniques used by the 
officers to obtain defendant's confession appear to have been 
improper, perhaps the trial court's denial ot defendant's 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO SUPPKESS 
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION FOR AN ALLEGEDLY 
DEFECTIVE MIRANDA WARNING. 
Defendant argues that, because Detective Hill's Miranda 
warning to defendant suggested tnat an attorney would not be 
available at the time of the initial interrogation but at some 
later time, the warning was inadequate and therefore defendant's 
waiver of his rights was invalid. However, this argument turns on 
an unreasonably rigid interpretation of the warning given and 
ignores significant case law from the United States Supreme Court 
and a number of lower courts. 
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^ In the trial court ai id ii i tl lis Cour t defendant relies 
exclusively on federal law for his analysis of the Miranda issue. 
Thereto:* , • " Ft die » ! .1 1 ] imit its response accordingly and not 
address the question under the state consti ti ition (assuming that 
a different analysis may be possible). 
POINT II 
ALTHOUGH THE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES USED BY 
THE OFFICERS TO OBTAIN DEFENDANTS CONFESSION 
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN IMPROPER, PERHAPS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S SUPPRES-
SION MOTION IS SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE TOTALITY 
OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST. 
A much more difficult issue is presented by defendant's 
contention that his confession was involuntary because it was 
induced by the threatening statements concerning a first degree 
murder charge as opposed to one for second degree murder made to 
him by one of the officers during questioning. It is difficult 
to interpret those statements (which are set forth above) as 
meaning anything but that (1) if defendant did not confess to 
killing his stepdaughter, he would face a first degree murder 
prosecution and probable execution, and (2) if he did confess, he 
would be tried for second degree murder which could result in 
"jail time." Although the trial court never specifically 
addressed defendant's voluntariness challenge which focused on 
this threat/promise, defendant clearly presented the argument 
prior to and at trial, and presumably the court rejected it. 
"The test of whether a confession is voluntary depends 
upon the totality of the circumstances." State v. Moore. 697 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Watts. 639 P.2d 158, 
160 (Utah 1981)). See also Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218 (1973). It is the duty and prerogative of the trial court to 
determine whether a defendants confession is voluntary and 
4
 Again, defendant relies solely on federal law in analyzing the 
voluntariness issue, and therefore the State will limit its 
response accordingly. 
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indicate that: government agents may validly 
make some representations to a defendant or 
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resulting confession involuntary. Government 
agents may initiate conversations on 
cooperation, they may promise to make a 
defendant's cooperation known to the 
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denied, 419 U.S. 1032. However, the rather overt threats made in 
the instant case do not appear to fall within the scope of the 
permissible representations identified in Shears. A number of 
courts have found a confession involuntary where a threat to 
pursue a higher charge if the accused did not cooperate (or a 
promise to pursue a lesser charge if the accused cooperated) was 
as exhortative as that at issue here or, in some instances, even 
less heavy-handed. United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335-
37 (9th Cir. 1981); Williams v. United States. 328 F.2d 669, 672 
(5th Cir. 1964); State v. Thomas, 148 Ariz. 225, 714 P.2d 395, 
397-98 (1986); State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 262-63 (Iowa 
1984); State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa 198^); Johnson 
v. State, 238 Ga. 27, 230 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1976); People v. 
Johnson, 74 Cal Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265, 270-71 (1969). Compare 
State v. Adkinson, 338 S.E.2d 185 (W.Va. 1985) (not coercive for 
officer to say that cooperation "probably" would result in 
lighter sentence, but that he would not promise anything), and 
People Vt HartqraveS, 31 111.2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964) cert. 
denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965) (not coercive to tell defendant it 
would "go easier in court for you if you made a statement"), with 
Womack v. State, 281 Ala. 499, 205 So.2d 579 (1967) (coercive to 
tell defendant it would "go lighter on him" if he confessed). 
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d e f e n d a n t , kf WM in ". n f o r t t e n ami f a m i l i a r u i t h t lit c i i m i n a l 
j u s t i c e s > s t i " i „ w* i i I i i t i i i I I I I ill I i 11 if a 
l i i L t d e g r e e m u r d e r c h a r g e a n d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y i I a d e a t h 
J
 Even though t h e r e may have been s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e w i t h o u t 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n f e s s i o n fo r t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t d e f e n d a n t f t h e 
a d m i s s i o n of a c o e r c e d c o n f e s s i o n can never be t r e a t e d as 
h a r m l e s s e r r o r , Paym v, A i k a n s a s , 356 U .S . 560 (1958) • l«t;t; 
a l s p Chapman v* C a l i f o r n i a , 386 U.S . 1 8 , 23 11967) ( c i t i n g J \ j , t 
a s a c a s e t h a t had i n d i c a t e d " t h a t t h e i e a r e some c o n s t i t u t n n il 
r i g h t s so b a s i c t o a f a i r t r i a l t h a t t h e i r i n f r a c t i o n can nevei 
be t r e a t e d as hami ler . r e r r o r l 
sentence. The following exchange between Detective Bell and 
defendant during the evening interview on February 27 illustrates 
this to a certain extent: 
PB: The matter that he is talking about 
Charlie, and I told you earlier today, 
there are two different charges that we 
are talking about here—1st degree 
murder • • . 
CS: You tell me . . . 
PB: Just a second, let us finish. Which is 
punishable by probably execution in the 
State of Utah, or we are talking about 
2nd degree homicide which is jail time. 
CS: Ya, life—what's the difference? 
PB: No, it's not life. We talked about that 
earlier today. Now what you are telling 
me about these Mexicanls] . • • 
CS: I have no life left. 
PB: What you are telling me • . . 
CS: This little thing doesn't matter, this 
is over and done. 
PB: No. let me explain it to you right now. 
The way you explained is that some 
Mexicanls] came up and you were aware 
that they were going to kill her and you 
are a party of her killing. We are 
talking 1st degree murder here. 
CS: I know this. 
PB: You could probably be executed. 
CS: I know this. And I don't care. 
PB: Yes you do care. 
CS: No I don't. 
PB: Now we talked earlier today, you cared. 
CS: I care about the ones I leave behind, 
but I have no life left—it doesn't 
matter to me anymore. 
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P B i N o i C h a r J I e 1 d o nf t b e 11 e ¥ e that., 
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in II> I inn 11 oin ci lev lew uf the e n t i r e r ecocd t h a t B e l l ' s imfrope; 
s t a t rnipnt r d id n o t a c t u a l l y induce d e f e n m n t t o c o n f e s s , II u4iw 
Coui I i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t such a c o n c l u s i o n i s s u p o i t e d by I he 
r e c o r d , d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n f e s s i o n , which MI llliuli i d i i K s wi th 
i i *-'.< nii| I ' iM'n .'. A d l i J« i IUHL « h i ! '^  I « -1 I "] ' J 
(Utah J 9 II -II I i, L . S t a t e v . Thomas , i 1 4 P , / I a I ' '< .' I i n hi 11 una , 
c o n f e s s i o n s a i e pr ima t a c i e i n v o i u n t a i i J , was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d 
a t t r i a l . 
F i n a l l y , fr "' h«i Cour t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e i ,r ar. 
i II • in I f i r i nn t r n c o i d iipnri wliiilh to d e t e r m i n e whe ther B e l l ' s 
s t a t e m e n t s i r .d jced de fendan t t J «:unfess f 1 "I i. . J ! ' i « ,MIIJ I J ' ' > 
to the t z i a l c o u r t t in tin t a k i n g of f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e and a 
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 Vl» f I 
h a v i r J c j in a d e j s [ > e c 11 J L I U J I I n J on v u 1 u 111. i i i i n * ,., ) .. [i, i^  n % i . ,L i j j § 
M a l e v, Vulk, JblJ S o . i d 12B (La. 1979) • 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the trial court's 
admission of defendant's confession is perhaps sustainable on the 
current record. Alternatively, the Court could remand the case 
for a clearer determination of the voluntariness of defendant's 
confession. fj 
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1987. 
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